अमेरिका मोदी को ईमानदार मानता है और यह सच विकीलिक्स ने प्रकाशित किया है, देखे मूल टैग के पहले पैरे की वारहवी लाइन
दो नवंबर 2006 को मुम्बई से सीआए एजेंट की ओर से भेजे गए एक गोपनीय संदेश के अनुसार नरेन्द्र मोदी ने अपने आप को नान करप्ट, अच्छे प्रशासक और बिजनेस को संरक्षण देने वाले नेता के रूप में स्थापित किया है। इसके समर्थन में विकीलिक्स ने मुम्बई में काउंसलर जनरल को भेजे गए वायर की प्रति भेजी है। देश में पहली बार इंडियन एक्सप्रेस ने ये समाचार प्रकाशित किया था।
इस सारे विवाद के बीच मैंने सारा विकीलिक्स छान मार तब जाकर 2 नवंबर 2006 का यह टैग मिला। इस टैक में मोदी और गुजरात का बखान किया गया है। इसके अलावा अन्य टैगों से पता चलता है कि अमेरिका किस प्रकार मोदी की एक-एक हरकत पर नजर रखे हुए है। इन टैगों का अध्ययन करें तो पता चलेबा कि अमेरिका मोदी की विकास नीतियों से प्रभावित है। सारे टैग पढऩे के बाद यह पता चलता कि अगर मोदी के हाथ में देश की सत्ता आ गई तो भारत काफी आगे निकल सकता है। ये सब विकीलिक्स ने छापा है। सबूत के साथ आपके लिए प्रस्तुत है।https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06MUMBAI1986_a.html
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2006 November 2, 12:42 (Thursday)
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06MUMBAI1986_a
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CVIS - Consular Affairs--Visas |ECON - Economic Affairs--Economic Conditions, Trends and Potential | IN- India | KIRF - International Religious Freedom | KISL - Islamic Issues |PGOV - Political Affairs--Government; Internal Governmental Affairs | PHUM- Political Affairs--Human Rights |PREL - Political Affairs--External Political Relations
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CLASSIFIED BY: Michael S. Owen, Consul General, Consulate
General Mumbai, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
Summary and Comment
-------------------
1. (C) Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi has his sights on
national politics. Everyone we spoke to during a recent trip to
Ahmedabad told us that Modi will use an expected state election
victory next year to make a bid for the national presidency of
the BJP. RSS and BJP leaders in Delhi echo these sentiments.
Many in the party leadership believe that Modi is the only
person of the BJP's many aspiring leaders who can reinvigorate
the party and stop its further slide into oblivion. No one
doubts that Modi will be reelected as Chief Minister of Gujarat
in elections scheduled for late 2007, since he remains immensely
popular among Gujarat's largely Hindu voters. Modi has
successfully branded himself as a non-corrupt, effective
administrator, as a facilitator of business in a state with a
deep commercial culture, and as a no-nonsense, law-and-order
politician who looks after the interests of the Hindu majority.
Modi's backers in the BJP now hope to convince the party
leadership that he can use these positive traits to attract
voters throughout India. Some BJP leaders believe, or hope,
that voters will forget or forgive Modi's role in the 2002
bloodshed, once they learn to appreciate his other qualities.
Views differ in Gujarat on whether Modi can overcome his
negative baggage to assume a national role. Some think that the
memory of 2002 will turn off voters. Others say his arrogant
and blunt leadership style will alienate the BJP hierarchy in
New Delhi as it has in Ahmedabad, or that Modi's lower caste
origins could become an obstacle at the national level.
2. (C) Against this backdrop of opinions, we believe that Modi's
rise in the BJP seems likely. In coordination with Embassy New
Delhi, we intend to continue our policy of interaction with the
Chief Minister, whose B1/B2 visa we revoked in 2005, at the
level of the Consul General. Since 2002, Mumbai Consul Generals
have routinely sought meetings with Modi whenever they visited
Ahmedabad. Such interaction allows us to deliver a clear
message on human rights and religious freedom directly to the
source. It will also shield us from accusations of opportunism
from the BJP that would invariably arise if we ignored Modi now
but sought a dialogue with him in the likely event that he makes
it to the national stage. End summary and comment.
Modi Sets Sights on National Politics
-------------------------------------
3. (SBU) Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi remains immensely
popular among the state's non-Muslim voters. Everyone we spoke
to during an Oct. 7-8 trip to Ahmedabad predicted that Modi
would easily win the next state elections, scheduled for late
2007. Views differ only on how large his victory will be.
4. (C) Our interlocutors were also unanimous in their belief
that Modi has already set his sights on national politics. Modi
hopes to use an electoral success as a springboard into the
national BJP leadership, we heard repeatedly. The BJP national
leadership, and particularly former deputy prime minister L.K.
Advani, were convinced that only Modi could rejuvenate the
party, Gujarat MP and BJP politician Harin Pathak told us.
According to our interlocutors, Advani and former law minister
Aroon Jaitley are the biggest Modi votaries in the central
leadership, as no other clear successor to the party's aging
leadership is in sight, and Modi's relative youth and obvious
leadership talents are attracting more attention at the party
center. The RSS's Ram Madhav told Embassy New Delhi the same
thing, going so far as to say that Modi's ascendancy is not a
question of if but when, and the USG must start considering now
how it will deal with Modi when he becomes head of the BJP and
leads the party's electoral campaign in the national elections
scheduled for 2009.
5. (C) Separately, Piyush Goyal, General Secretary for the BJP
MUMBAI 00001986 002 OF 005
in Maharashtra, said the BJP leadership is convinced that Modi
can appeal to wide segments of Indian voters outside of Gujarat,
and that his role in the 2002 bloodshed will not necessarily
damage his popularity. Goyal said many within the BJP believe
that Modi has the potential to become Prime Minister, and that
voters may forget 2002 once the Chief Minister's other qualities
become widely known. The attributes that have made Modi so
popular in Gujarat are the qualities that the BJP would use at
the national level as well, Goyal said.
Modi the Administrator
----------------------
6. (C) Most BJP insiders tell us that Gujarat's voters like Modi
because he has successfully branded himself as an effective
administrator and a pro-business, no-nonsense, law-and-order
politician. Supporters and critics alike acknowledge that Modi
is an effective administrator. He has successfully cultivated
the image of a clean politician who has reduced corruption in
public life in Gujarat. Views differ on how clean and
non-corrupt Modi actually is, however. All our interlocutors
acknowledge that Modi is a modest man who, unlike many elected
officials in India, has not used his position to enrich himself
or his family. Most contacts also say that he has purged the
state administration of petty corruption at the mid- and lower
levels of the bureaucracy. However, several people tell us that
big ticket corruption is still common. Journalist Javed
Rahmatullah claimed that Reliance Industries Ltd. (RIL) paid a
large bribe for permission to expand its refinery in Jamnagar.
The money went into the BJP's party coffers, Rahmatullah
claimed, and not to Modi or any other individual. Other
contacts have told us that business money flows to the BJP in
Gujarat, but nobody had been this specific. We have been unable
to verify Rahmatullah's claim.
Modi and Business
-----------------
7. (SBU) Modi's supporters claim that the state's economy has
flourished under his leadership. They cite the state's annual
growth rate of around nine percent, 15 percent growth in
industrial production, sizable public investment in
infrastructure and Gujarat's top ranking among Indian states as
a destination for domestic investment. Among the five state
governments in our Consular district, the GOG is the most
visibly active in its attempts to attract investment, both
domestic and foreign. One state agency recently supported a
road show to the U.S. aimed at attracting foreign investment.
The GOG is aggressively promoting special economic zones (SEZs)
as a means to create new jobs and modernize infrastructure in
the state.
8. (SBU) Modi's pro-business stance has won over the state's
large business and trader community. Most businessmen say Modi
has created a positive business climate in the state. Under
Modi's leadership, red tape has been reduced, and most
government officials support business rather than act as an
obstacle to it, we hear repeatedly.
9. (SBU) The economic reality of Gujarat, however, may be far
more complex than the ebullient statements of Modi's supporters
suggest. Although Gujarat tops all Indian states in terms of
investment intentions, actual investment is far less, and
certainly less than the neighboring state of Maharashtra.
Despite the presence of a few well-known international
companies, FDI flows into the state are relatively small.
Gujarat received less than four percent of the FDI coming into
India in the past five years (Note: Delhi and Maharashtra, the
top two FDI destinations, got 28 percent and 22 percent
respectively. End Note) Ahmedabad does not have the visible
construction activity, and increasingly noticeable foreign
presence, of Pune in neighboring Maharashtra, for example. Many
Gujaratis will say that the state is still not sufficiently
known abroad. Some contacts are confident that investment will
increase in tandem with growing awareness of Gujarat's business
climate spawned by the GOG's aggressive marketing. Other
sources were far less sanguine, and argue that the stain of the
2002 riots and the poor human rights record of its leadership
continue to deter foreign companies fearful of further communal
MUMBAI 00001986 003 OF 005
violence. Arvind Agarwal, GOG Industries Commissioner, conceded
to us that the riots continue to negatively influence images of
the state abroad.
Modi, Law-and-Order and Hindutva
--------------------------------
10. (C) Modi has successfully cultivated the image of a
no-nonsense, law-and order politician among Gujarat voters.
This image of Modi as a strong, decisive leader is what his BJP
supporters hope will help him establish a foothold at the
national level.
11. (C) Modi's role in the 2002 bloodshed continues to divide
Gujaratis and Indians in general. While he remains repugnant to
large numbers of people, particularly Muslims, human rights
activists and educated urbanites with liberal or leftist
leanings, many in the Hindu majority view his actions in 2002
favorably. Negative attitudes towards Muslims remain firmly
anchored among Gujarati Hindus. Many feel that they, and not
the Muslim minority, are the true second class citizens of
India. Muslims often "stepped out of line," prior to 2002, we
often hear, demanding and receiving exceptional treatment by
politicians who felt the need to placate them on the basis of
perceived injustices carried out by the Hindu majority. That
changed when Modi came into power in 2002, they say. While no
one will openly condone the bloodshed of 2002, many Gujarati
Hindus feel that Modi "put Muslims into their place." The BJP
continues to echo these themes in its national political stance,
especially over issues such as Hajj subsidies, the Muslim civil
code, the singing of Vande Mataram, or other such religiously
sensitive concerns.
12. (C) Modi continues to support a Hindutva agenda in the
state, with the recent passage of amendments to the state's
anti-conversion law (ref A) being seen as a concession to his
supporters on the Hindu right. Both supporters and critics of
Modi confirm that the state government continues to use
administrative tools to marginalize and ghettoize the Muslim
minority.
13. (C) At the same time, most interlocutors tell us that Modi
cannot gain anything more by openly pursuing an aggressive
Hindutva agenda. He already has the backing of those who
applaud his firm stand against Muslims, and he risks alienating
swing voters in Gujarat by being too openly communal. Modi
understands that, outside of Gujarat, his role in the 2002 riots
has damaged both his reputation and that of the state. He also
realizes that outbreaks of communal violence in Gujarat will
harm both his chances in the state and nationally, and hence he
has given law enforcement agencies clear instructions to act
swiftly if violence breaks out, we have been told. Several
interlocutors cited Modi's rapid reaction to the communal
rioting in Vadodara in May (ref B) as proof of his new strategy.
Modi allowed federal army troops to establish order, and he
even visited hospitalized Muslim victims of the riots in an
attempt to portray himself as a leader of all Gujaratis.
Modi's Leadership Style
-----------------------
14. (C) Views remain divided on whether Modi's leadership style
will help or harm him if he enters national politics. In public
appearances, Modi can be charming and likeable. By all
accounts, however, he is an insular, distrustful person who
rules with a small group of advisors. This inner circle acts as
a buffer between the Chief Minister and his cabinet and party.
He reigns more by fear and intimidation than by inclusiveness
and consensus, and is rude, condescending and often derogatory
to even high level party officials. He hoards power and often
leaves his ministers in the cold when making decisions that
affect their portfolios. His abrasive leadership style
alienated much of the state BJP leadership in 2005. He was able
to quell their subsequent rebellion by branding them as corrupt
opportunists who were angry because he denied them the tools of
political patronage and corruption (ref C). Modi maintains the
support of most MLAs in the state because they understand his
popularity with voters. His leadership style has created many
enemies within the state party, however. This opposition could
MUMBAI 00001986 004 OF 005
come back to haunt him at the national level, some critics hope.
In any case there is consensus that Modi has failed to attract
a sustainable, loyal cadre of followers within the state party,
and that his few confidants will likely be pushed out of power
and influence if and when Modi leaves the state for New Delhi.
At the national stage, he will have to depend on opportunists
who want to latch onto his bandwagon, some believe.
Modi and Caste
--------------
15. (C) Caste resentments exacerbate the bad feelings between
Modi and much of the state party's leadership. Modi heralds
from a so-called Other Backward Caste (OBC), while many of his
opponents are from higher castes, and in particular from the
Patel caste that dominates public life in the state. The Chief
Minister is openly distrustful of the higher-caste party
officials around him, yet is careful not to make caste an issue
since he seeks the support of the Gujarati commercial class,
most of whom are Patels or other higher castes. Gujarat
Congress spokesman Himanshu Vyas told us his party hopes to play
the caste card in the 2007 elections to divide Modi's support
among Hindus, yet none of our other interlocutors believed that
caste issues could endanger a Modi victory at the polls. Some
believe, however, that Modi's lower caste status could create
problems for him in national politics.
Econoff's Unscheduled Meeting with the Chief Minister
--------------------------------------------- --------
16. (C) The USG has not met Modi since his B1/B2 visa was
revoked in 2005, yet Embassy Econoff had an unscheduled courtesy
call with the Chief Minister on the margins of our recent visit
to Gujarat. While paying a personal visit to a family friend
who works in Modi's office, she was quickly whisked through the
several perimeters of security surrounding the Chief Minister
and introduced to Modi himself. Modi was pleasant and,
conversing only in Gujarati, asked her the purpose of the USG
visit to the state (Note: The local edition of the Times of
India speculated earlier that day why USG officials were in
Gujarat and indicated they might be on a "secret" mission. End
note) After Econoff clarified the purpose of the visit to meet
with contacts to assess Gujarat's political, economic, and
social environment, Modi seemed surprised that U.S. officials
would travel to Gujarat, saying the USG had warned the state is
"unsafe." Econoff responded by stressing that while the USG has
serious concerns about human rights and religious freedom, we do
not restrict visitors or opportunities for U.S. companies to
invest in Gujarat. Modi also asked what our contacts said about
the current state of human rights and religious freedom in
Gujarat. Econoff replied that the opinions were mixed.
Comment
-------
17. (C) Modi's dominance of Gujarat politics is likely to
continue for now, and by all accounts he should get reelected
easily next year. Among our contacts, there is not yet a
consensus on Modi's chances for success at the national level,
but some feel strongly in Delhi and Gujarat that his rise is
inevitable. If Modi does eventually get a national leadership
role in the BJP in the foreseeable future, the USG will be
obliged to decide how it wants to deal with a figure of national
prominence whose B1/B2 we revoked. We believe it would dilute
our influence to avoid Modi completely. If we waited to engage
Modi after he attains national stature within India's largest
and most important opposition party, many in the BJP would
likely view this as an opportunistic move and only deepen the
suspicions cultivated by some BJP leaders in western India since
the visa revocation. Since the riots of 2002, we have declined
to engage Modi at the Ambassadorial level, but Mumbai Consul
Generals have routinely sought meetings with Modi whenever they
visited Ahmedabad. We will continue to seek such meetings at
the level of the CG to emphasize that the USG does not have a
formal no-contact policy (Note: The CG requested a meeting
during his initial visit to Gujarat in 2005, but Modi was
traveling that day), and to demonstrate to the BJP that we are
interested in cultivating relationships with the party while it
MUMBAI 00001986 005 OF 005
is in the opposition. Direct encounters with Modi will also
enable us to deliver a clear message regarding USG concerns for
the state of human rights and religious freedom in Gujarat. End
comment.
18. (U) Embassy New Delhi cleared this cable.
OWEN
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